Abstract: A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of de…nition. For the same reason, di¤erent conditions may be equivalent for functions de…ned on some domains, while di¤erent in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of di¤erent conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We de…ne two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance. We remark that they are not always su¢ cient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions de…ned on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.
Introduction
Strategy-proofness is a highly desirable but hard to meet property of social choice functions. E¤orts to understand the implications of this requirement have naturally led to study properties that are necessary and/or su¢ cient for its ful…llment (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977, Moulin, 1988) . E¤orts to identify conditions under which it can be satis…ed by nontrivial rules have directed attention to the importance of the domains on which they are de…ned (Moulin, 1980 , Barberà, Gul, and Stachetti, 1991 , Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1993 , Sprumont, 1991 , Moulin and Shenker, 1992 , Pápai, 2000 .
We concentrate here in the study of two conditions that are clearly related with that of strategy-proofness and that we …nd especially attractive. We call them reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity. We …rst show that they are jointly equivalent to strategy-proofness for social choice functions de…ned on the universal domain. Then we remark that the equivalence between our conditions and strategy-proofness does not hold in general. Reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity are always necessary for strategy-proofness, whatever the domain of de…nition of the functions, but need not be su¢ cient. Because of that, we ask ourselves the following question: can we identify domains of preferences having the property that, when functions are de…ned on these domains, then our conditions are equivalent to strategy-proofness?
We answer this question in the positive. For those domains that we call intertwined, and for any possible rule de…ned on them, the equivalence holds.
Other authors have proposed alternative conditions, also closely related to strategyproofness. We single out two of them, for reference and comparison: Moulin's (1988) notion of strong monotonicity and Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) strong positive association. These conditions are also equivalent to strategy-proofness, and therefore to the ones we propose, for functions de…ned on the universal domain of strict preferences. 1 We show that, indeed, the equivalence still holds for any functions de…ned on any intertwined domain, but not necessarily otherwise.
This research is part of an e¤ort to understand the role of domain restrictions in mechanism design, and more speci…cally in connection with the possibility of achieving strategyproofness. Since the bite of this and other related conditions, like those we introduce in the present paper, depends on the type of preferences that are admissible for individuals, it is natural that they precipitate impossibility results for some domains, and not for others.
In fact, the equivalence of di¤erent sets of formal conditions is not particularly illuminating when these apply to social choice functions de…ned on the universal domain, since the only rules that can satisfy them in that case and have more than two alternatives in the range must be dictatorial. The comparison between di¤erent requirements becomes much more signi…cant when these are imposed on domains on which it is indeed possible to …nd non-trivial rules that may be able to meet some of the properties.
It is interesting to notice that some of the restricted domains admitting non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions are indeed intertwined. This is the case, for example, if our domain is the set of all strict preference pro…les that are single-peaked (for a given order of the alternatives). It is also the case when alternatives are allocations of a single indivisible object to agents who only care about the object they receive, like in simple models of house allocation. Yet, other domains also admitting non trivial strategy-proof rules, like those where each agent exhibits separable or additive preferences, are not intertwined.
The notion of group strategy-proofness is stronger, and in a sense more natural and attractive than that of (individual) strategy-proofness. Yet, in view of the di¢ culty to identify functions satisfying the weaker of the two properties, the analysis of the stronger one has been less intensive. One of our results in this paper reinforces our understanding of the connections between the two versions of strategy-proofness, and also between those and the remaining properties under discussion: reshu-ing invariance, monotonicity, strong monotonicity or strong positive association. When the set of admissible preferences is identical for all agents, then intertwined domains also satisfy the property of indirect sequential inclusion. And, as shown in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2010) , this means that any function de…ned on these domains will be group strategy-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof. As a corollary, we learn that the conditions that were till now associated with the weak notion of strategy-proofness are also necessary and su¢ cient for the stronger notion, on a wide variety of cases.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we de…ne the framework, we introduce di¤erent properties of social choice functions and start discussing the relationships among them. In Section 3 we present our new de…nition of intertwined domains and prove our main equivalence result. Section 4 shows that a number of interesting domains are indeed intertwined. Sections 5 and 6 (and the Appendix) relate our work with other parts of the literature. In Section 5 we relate our main conditions on social choice functions with others that have been discussed and used by other authors. In Section 6 and in the Appendix we compare intertwined domains with others that have been proposed over the years, to essentially conclude that our new condition is di¤erent from existing ones. Section 7 concludes.
The setup: de…nitions and preliminary results
Let A be a …nite set of alternatives 2 and N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite set of agents. Let R be the set of all preorders (complete, re ‡exive, and transitive binary relations) on A and R i R be the set of admissible preferences for agent i 2 N . Denote by P R the set of all antisymmetric preorders. We denote by R i 2 R i an admissible preference relation and let as usual, P i and I i be the strict and the indi¤erence part of R i , respectively. When all the admissible preferences for individual i are strict, we will use the notation P i , instead of the general expression R i . A preference pro…le, denoted by R N = (R 1 ; :::; R n ); is an element 2 As soon as we go to a continuum of alternatives we are typically led to further complicate our simple models, to establish some topology on the set of alternatives, to introduce notions of continuity in the preferences, etc... We avoid any complications of this kind by sticking to the …nite framework. of i2N R i . Let C; S N be two coalitions such that C S. We will write the subpro…le R S = (R C ; R SnC ) 2 i2S R i when we want to stress the role of coalition C in S. Then the subpro…les R C 2 i2C R i and R SnC 2 i2SnC R i denote the preferences of agents in C and in SnC, respectively. In the case, where we denote full preference pro…le (that is, when S = N ), we simplify notation by using (R C ; R N nC ) as (R C ; R C ).
For any R i 2 R i and x 2 A, E(R i ; x) = fy 2 A : xI i yg stands for the indi¤erence class to which x belongs to. For any R i 2 R i and B
A such that for all z; t 2 B, zI i t, de…ne the lower contour set of R i at B and the upper contour set of R i at B as L(R i ; B) = fy 2 A : xR i y for some x 2 Bg and U (R i ; B) = fy 2 A : yR i x for some x 2 Bg, respectively. Similarly, de…ne the strict lower contour set at B and the strict upper contour set at B as L(R i ; B) = fy 2 A : xP i y for some x 2 Bg and U (R i ; B) = fy 2 A : yP i x for some x 2 Bg, respectively.
A social choice function (or also a rule) is a function f : i2N R i ! A. We now introduce some interesting properties that social choice functions may or may not be able to satisfy. Notice that the domains of the functions are an important part of our de…nitions. Indeed, a property may be satis…ed by a rule on a domain, but may not when its domain is expanded or reduced.
We will focus on rules that are nonmanipulable by a single agent. We …rst de…ne what we mean by a manipulation and then we introduce the well known concept of strategy-proofness.
Notice that the domains of our social choice functions will always have the form of a cartesian product. This is necessary to give meaning to our de…nition of strategy-proofness. Also notice that, although the notion of a domain is attached to that of a given function, we shall also refer to any cartesian family of preference pro…les as a domain, and to its cartesian subsets as its subdomains. This is consistent with tradition, although it would be more precise to call them potential domains, as we shall in fact consider sets of functions that could be de…ned on them.
We now de…ne the main conditions in our characterization result, monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance. Before that, an important comment is in order: All of our de…nitions (also the one of intertwined domains in Section 3) become nicely simpli…ed in the case of strict preferences. For the sake of compactness we only present them in their general form. However, the interested reader is invited to consider how they would specialize when indi¤erences would not be allowed in our domains. Then, conditions become even more transparent. As always, introducing indi¤erences provides generality at the cost of added complexities.
x such that the following conditions hold:
, and (iii) for any y; w 2 AnB
In words: R 0 i is a x-monotonic transformation of R i if there exists a set B R i
x containing x which is now an indi¤erence class of R 0 i on its own, which was a subset of x's indi¤erence class in R i , and such that the relative position of its elements has improved when going from R i to R 0 i , while all the rest of alternatives keep in the same relative positions with each other. We can now de…ne monotonicity. Figure 1 provides an illustration of how it works.
De…nition 4 A social choice function f satis…es monotonicity on i2N R i if and only if for any R N 2 i2N R i such that f (R N ) = x, and for any (R In words: If an alternative x is chosen by a social choice function f at pro…le (R i ; R i ), and R 0 i is a new preference where x has improved its position (maybe in the company of some other alternatives in his R i indi¤erence class), then f must still choose x or some of the alternatives that were initially indi¤erent to it. Figure 1 illustrates the meaning of the condition.
We now turn to our second condition. First, de…ne reshu-ings.
De…nition 5 Let R i 2 R i and x 2 A. We say that R 
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In words: R 0 i is a x-reshu-ing of R i if it results from keeping all alternatives that were worse than x, as still being worse, though maybe in a di¤erent order; and all alternatives that are better than x in R 0 i were already better in R i , again maybe in a di¤erent order. Notice that we allow some elements ranked above x in R i to become indi¤erent to x in R 0 i . When preferences are strict, condition (i) implies condition (ii), and furthermore, U (R 0 i ; x) = U (R i ; x). Figure 2 illustrates the reshu-ing invariance property, which we now formally de…ne.
De…nition 6 A social choice function f satis…es reshu-ing invariance on i2N R i if and only if for any R N 2 i2N R i such that f (R N ) = x, and for any (R In words: If an alternative x is chosen at a pro…le, some alternative in x's indi¤erence class at this pro…le must be chosen at any other pro…le obtained from an x-reshu-ing of agent i's preferences. Notice that in the case of strict preferences x must be obtained at the new pro…le.
The following Proposition marks the start of our research. We remark that monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance, our two independent conditions, are necessary for any social choice function de…ned on any domain to be strategy-proof, and that they are, moreover, also su¢ cient for the universal domain. However, we also show that our conditions are not always su¢ cient to guarantee strategy-proofness: we present a rule satisfying both of them which is nevertheless manipulable. This is why, even if we are admitting indi¤erence classes, the notion of a reshu-ing around an alternative does not need any further quali…cations. 4 Our two conditions factorize and separate two types of transformations that are sometimes mixed together in the same requirement. Even then, further factorizations are conceivable. For example, in Barberà and Dutta (1982) it becomes useful to distinguish between reshu-ings that occur in the upper contour set of an alternative and those that involve its lower contour set only. But we stay with our simple conditions, which we …nd very intuitive and clear to relate to strategy-proofness.
Proposition 1 (1) Reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity are necessary conditions for a social choice function to be strategy-proof, regardless of the cartesian domain on which f is de…ned.
(2) For social choice functions de…ned on the universal domain of preferences over alternatives, reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the strategy-proofness of f . (3) There exist cartesian domains of preferences and social choice functions de…ned on them for which satisfying reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity is not su¢ cient for f to be strategy-proof.
Proof. To prove part (1) of Proposition 1, let f be a strategy-proof social choice function de…ned on a cartesian domain i2N R i . Suppose …rst that f violates reshu-ing invariance, that is, there exist R N such that f (R N ) = x and R 
Then, in both cases we obtain the corresponding contradictions to strategy-proofness. The proof of part (2) is postponed, as it is a corollary of our general result in Theorem 1. To prove part (3), an example with strict preferences will su¢ ce. Consider a problem with three voters N = f1; 2; 3g and two candidates a and b, to be elected to join a club. The alternatives are to choose both, or only one of them, or none of the two. Hence, alternatives are sets of candidates A = f?;a; b; fa; bgg. Given a preference on sets, candidates are called good if they are better than the empty set, when chosen alone, and bad otherwise. Preferences are separable if adding a good candidate to any set makes the union better, and adding a bad one makes the union worse. Our example refers to a voting rule de…ned on the domain of separable preferences for this case of two candidates, four alternatives and three voters. The set of individual separable preferences is:
? De…ne the rule as the Borda count on A with tie breaking. Voters rank the four alternatives, and each alternative gets three points whenever a voter ranks it …rst, two when ranked second, one when third and none if last. The choice is the alternative with the highest sum of points, if unique. As for possible ties, notice that, in our example, when there is a tie for …rst position. there may be at most one voter for whom none of the tied alternatives is the best for him. If there is such an individual, the tie is broken in favor of that alternative that he prefers. Otherwise, the tie is broken according to a pre-determined order of alternatives, say O : fa; bg; b; a; ?.
Notice that the only cases where the antecedents of reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity would apply are those where we change a preference to another having the same top. Given that, it is easy to see that both conditions are respected in our example. Yet, observe that the function is still manipulable. To see that, let R = (R 1 ; R 6 ; R 7 ); R 0 = (R 6 ; R 6 ; R 7 ). Then, f (R) = b (b and fa; bg have the same score and agent 1 breaks the tie) and f (R 0 ) = fa; bg (b and fa; bg have the same score but all agents have b or fa; bg as best alternative, so we use O. Thus, agent 1 manipulates f at R 0 via R 1 .
This ends the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 sets the ground for our main research question. Given that our two conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for strategy-proofness in the universal domain, but not su¢ cient for other cases where the domain is restricted, can we tell apart those domains where su¢ ciency holds, from those where it does not? As we shall see, we can. Moreover, our research leads us to de…ne a type of domains which are interesting of their own right, for reasons we will discuss along the paper.
Intertwined domains
We now introduce our notion of intertwined domains. Whether a domain is intertwined or not will turn out to be crucial to determine whether the di¤erent conditions we are interested in may or may not be equivalent, when applied to social choice functions de…ned on such domains.
Before we provide a formal de…nition, let us describe the condition informally for the case of strict preferences (see Figure 3 ). Select any two (strict) preferences R and R 0 , and any two alternatives x and y, where xP y (the relationship between the two in R 0 can be any). Suppose that there exists in our domain a third preference R such that one can transform R into R, through a sequences of changes in the positions of alternatives, such that these changes, at each step, simply consist in lifting the position of y, or of reshu-ings around y. Suppose that one can also transform R 0 into R through another sequence of the same type of transformations, this time with liftings of x and reshu-ings around x. We will then say that R and R 0 are (x; y)-intertwined.
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A domain of preferences will be intertwined if and only if any two of the preferences it contains are intertwined for any two alternatives.
Even more informally, we can say that an intertwined domain is one where one can travel from any pair of preferences to some intermediary preference just by lifting and reshu-ing alternatives. We now proceed to our formal de…nitions.
In what follows, we use again the notation B Rt x that was introduced when de…ning xmonotonic transformations (De…nition 3). When specializing De…nitions 9-12, to the case of strict preferences, the reader should keep in mind that then B x = x. De…nition 9 Let R i ; R i 2 R and x 2 A. We say that R i is a x-transform of R i if there exist a sequence of preferences R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R T such that R 1 = R i , R T = R i , and for any t 2 (1; T ], each R t is a x-direct transform of R t 1 where B R t 1 x = B x for each t when the x-direct transform of R t 1 is a x-monotonic transformation.
The set B x will consist of those alternatives (including x itself) that are indi¤erent to x in R i and that will be "lifted" along with x in the sequence of intertwineds leading from R i to R i . Our quali…cation is that, although x may be accompanied by some of these indi¤erent alternatives along the sequence, those that are lifted once continue to be lifted all along.
De…nition 10 Let R i ; R 0 i 2 R i , x; y 2 A where xP i y. We say that R i is (x; y)-intertwined with R 0 i if there exists R i 2 R i such that R i is both a y-transform of R i and a x-transform of R 0 i where
6 Note that a pure reshu-ing as de…ned here is a particular case of reshu-ings, as they appear in De…nition 5. Both refer to tranformations of preferences. But our de…nition here will be used for the purpose of restricting domains of preferences, while in the preceding section De…nition 5 was later used to establish a condition on social choice functions. Their uses here and there are, in principle, logically independent.
As already remarked after De…nition 9, the sets B x and B y are those that accompany x and y, respectively, in the monotone transformations leading from R 0 i and from R i to R i . In the de…nition above we impose the additional requirement that these two sets do not intersect: if E(R i ; y) and E(R 0 i ; x) contain some common elements, these can join either y or x in the monotone transformations from R i or from R 0 i , but not both of them.
De…nition 11 A set of individual preferences R i is intertwined if for any R i 2 R i , for any x; y 2 A such that xP i y, and any
De…nition 12 A domain i2N R i is intertwined if for any agent i, R i is intertwined.
We are now ready to state our equivalence result.
Theorem 1 Any social choice function de…ned on an intertwined domain is strategy-proof if and only if it satis…es monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance.
Proof. That these conditions are necessary for strategy-proofness is already proven, as Part (1) of Proposition 1 above. To prove that they are su¢ cient, let us proceed by contradiction. Let i2N R i be an intertwined domain and assume that f satis…es reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity, but is manipulable. That is, there exist R N 2 i2N R i and R
i ; x)nE(R i ; y): By de…nition, x 2 B x and y 2 B y . We distinguish two cases. Case 1: E(R i ; y) \ E(R 0 i ; x) = ?: By reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity the following two conditions hold: On the one hand, f (R i ; R i ) 2 E(R i ; y) and on the other hand f (
Note that in Case 2, neither only by y-pure reshu-ings of R i and/or by x-pure reshu-ings of R 0 i , nor by x-pure reshu-ing of R 0 i and y-monotonic transforms of R i can be enough to connect R i and R 0 i in an intertwined way. In the latter case note that B y cannot join x (it is not a feasible monotonic transformation). Thus, there must exist R t , R t+1 such that R t+1 is a x-monotonic transformation of R t . That is, x must go up at some step. Without loss of generality, suppose that the …rst time x goes up is for t = 1. That is,
By de…nition of intertwinedness, B x \ E(R i ; y) = ?. Then, on the one hand, going from R 0 i 7 See Figure 4 for a particular illustration that may help the reader to follow the arguments in the proof of Case 2.
to R i by consecutively applying monotonicity or reshu-ing invariance, f selects alternatives in B x . On the other hand, going from R i to R i by consecutively applying monotonicity or reshu-ing invariance, f selects alternatives in E(R i ; y) which is a contradiction of f being a function. Subcase 2.2: Suppose f (R 2 ; R i ) = 2 B x , thus f (R 2 ; R i ) 6 = x. Then we get a contradiction to the fact that f satis…es reshu-ing invariance (going from R 2 to R 0 i , B x goes down and joins E(R
This completes the proof. Note that if all agents have strict preferences, that is i2N P i , the equivalence between strategy-proofness and our two conditions still holds. The same proof would work and only Case 1 would be relevant.
Therefore, being de…ned on an intertwined domain is su¢ cient to guarantee equivalence between our two properties and strategy-proofness. However, intertwinedness is not a necessary domain condition for this equivalence to hold. Example 1 presents a non-intertwined domain where every monotonic and reshu-ing invariant social choice function is strategyproof.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; z; vg; and P 1 = P 2 = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g where:
Note …rst that this domain is not intertwined: R 1 is not xy-intertwined with R 3 . By construction, one can also check that any social choice function satisfying monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance is strategy-proof. To check which monotonic and reshu-ing invariant rules we can construct, consider the following four cases Case 1:
If Case 1 or Case 2 holds, we obtain the constant rule x or z, respectively. If Case 3 holds, we obtain either the constant rule y or else 4 rules with binary range y; z. If Case 4 holds, we obtain either the constant rule v or else 4 rules with binary range v; x. Thus, in total we may have 12 monotonic and reshu-ing invariant rules. It is easy to check that all of them are strategy-proof.
We …nish this section with two remarks for the very careful reader. First, note that the requirement "xP i y" in De…nition 11 of an intertwined set of preferences bites. By ruling out that assumption, we would get a stronger domain condition, that would be violated by the set of strict single-peaked preferences in the problem of the provision of a public good and also by the set of all strict preferences (as shown in Example 2).
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; zg; and P 1 = P 2 = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 ; R 4 g where:
P 1 is the set of all single-peaked preferences (given the order x<y<z) which we later show that are intertwined. Observe that xP 1 y (i.e. y is not strictly preferred to x for R 1 ) and R 1 is not (y; x)-"intertwined" with R 3 in the stronger sense. Consider e P i = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 ; R 4 ; R 5 ; R 6 g where xP 5 zP 5 y and zP 6 xP 6 y. Note that e P i is the set of all strict preferences on A. Adding R 5 and R 6 does not help to (y; x)-"intertwin" R 1 with R 3 .
Second, observe that we could have considered a weaker version of reshu-ing invariance, say WRI, imposing some condition only for pure reshu-ings. That is, graphically WRI would be represented by the above part in Figure 2 . In such case though, our intertwined domain condition is not su¢ cient to guarantee that WRI and monotonicity imply strategy-proofness (see Example 3).
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; zg; and R 1 = R 2 = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g where:
The reader can carefully check that R i is intertwined. Let f be such that f (R 1 ; R 2 ) = f (R 3 ; R 2 ) = x, f (R 2 ; R 2 ) = z for any R 2 2 R 2 . Observe that f satis…es monotonicity (it only needs to be checked when agent 1 changes preferences from R 3 to R 1 ) and f satis…es weak reshu-ing invariance too (trivially, since there is no pure reshu-ing at some alternative in the range). Clearly, f is manipulable by agent 1: f (R 2 ; R 2 ) = zP 1 x = f (R 1 ; R 2 ). Observe also that f violates reshu-ing invariance (R 2 is a reshu-ing of R 1 at x; thus f (R 2 ; R 2 ) should belong to E(R 1 ; x) = x which is not the case).
The interested reader may also wonder whether a weaker notion of intertwinedness (one where we would not insist in pure reshu-ings only) might still allow for an analogous equivalence to the one we get in Theorem 1. We do not know. But we cannot …nd of relevant cases that would then be covered and that are not already accounted for under our present de…nition.
Examples
In this section, we show that several interesting preference domains are indeed intertwined. Some of the examples come from the classical social choice tradition, but we also present domains that involve the allocation of private goods. It is precisely because of these applications that we have insisted in preferences allowing for indi¤erences (since sel…sh agents are indi¤erent among the many allocations where they receive the same amount of goods), and also in domains where the families of admissible preferences for di¤erent agents are not the same (since agents value the same allocation by looking at their di¤erent components, which, in addition, may come from personalized sets of consequences).
In the case of pure public goods, domain restrictions can be expressed directly in terms of the alternatives involved. This is the case for the main domains that we start with. Note that the same proof of Proposition 2 and 3 below would work to state that the strict versions of the domains analyzed in each one of the propositions are also intertwined.
Universal domain
For individual preferences, the universal domain is the set of all complete, re ‡exive, and transitive binary relations on A; that is, the universal domain is R i = R (see Section 2).
Before showing intertwinedness when the set of individual preferences is the universal domain, consider the following fact, that applies to any set of individual preferences. Fact 1 Any preferences R i ; R 0 i 2 R that share the same set of best alternatives T are x-pure reshu-ings of each other for any x 2 T .
Proposition 2 The universal domain is intertwined.
Proof. Let R i ; R 0 i 2 R i = R, x; y 2 A where xP i y. Let R i 2 R be a y-pure reshu-ing of R i such that p(R i ) = x (if x is the best alternative according to R i this step would not be necessary). Let e R i 2 R be a monotonic transformation of R 0 i at x such that p( e R i ) = x (if x is the best alternative according to R 0 i this step would not be necessary). Note that R i is a x-pure reshu-ing of e R i by Fact 1. This completes the proof.
The single-peaked domain
Single-peakedness arises as a natural restriction on the preferences of agents facing many relevant problems: determining the level of a pure public good without transfers, locating a facility on a line, deciding on a tax level, choosing among candidates, among others.
De…nition 13 An individual preference R i 2 R is single-peaked on A relative to a linear order > of the set of alternatives if and only if (1) R i has a unique maximal element p i (R i ), called the peak of i, and (2) for all y; z 2 A
Denote by S > $ R the set of individual preferences consisting of all single-peaked preferences relative to >.
We show that the set of all single-peaked preferences de…ned on A is intertwined. Before that, we present two other facts that apply for single-peaked preferences. Fact 2 For any single-peaked preference R i 2 S > , any x and y 2 U (R i ; x), there exists R 0 i which is also single-peaked and a x-pure reshu-ing of R i . Fact 3 For any single-peaked preference R i 2 S > with peak p(R i ) and any x which is contiguous to p(R i ) in the order >, the x-monotonic transformation of R i for which x becomes top is also single-peaked.
Proposition 3 For any order >, the set of individual preferences S > is intertwined.
Proof. Let R i 2 S > and x; y 2 A such that xP i y: Take any R 0 i 2 S > . Without loss of generality, let x < y according to the order on A. We have to show that R i is (x; y)-intertwined with R Consider …rst R i a y-pure reshu-ing of R i such that p(R i ) = x. It exists since we have all single-peaked preferences. Now, let e R i 2 S > be a x-pure reshu-ing of R 0 i such that p( e R i ) = x + 1 (observe that if x + 1 = y, we could not be in Case 1). By Fact 2, e R i exists. Now, consider R i be a x-monotonic transformation of e R i such that p(R i ) = x. By Fact 3, R i is single-peaked. Note that R i and R i have the same peak thus by Fact 1, R i is a x-pure reshu-ing of R i . Thus, R i 2 S > is both a y-(direct) transform of R i and a x-transform of R exists. Now, consider R i be a x-monotonic transformation of e R i such that p(R i ) = x. By Fact 3, R i is single-peaked. Note that R i and R i have the same peak thus by Fact 1, R i is a x-reshu-ing of R i . Therefore, R i is both a y-(direct) transform of R i and a x-transform of R 
Intertwined domains with private goods
When we work with private goods, more structure is added to the description of the alternatives, and this additional structure suggests a re-de…nition of domain restrictions. We look here at this structure and at its implications on the de…nition of domain restrictions for the case of one private good. With n agents, an alternative a is an n-tuple of values (a 1 ; :::; a n ), one for each agent.
Let A i be the set of values that are admissible for the i-th component, and let A Q i2N A i . The idea of sel…shness is associated with the assumptions that (1) each agent i has a well-de…ned preference ordering on A i , and (2) agent i's ordering of any pair of alternatives a, a 0 2 A is only based on her ordering of their i-th components a i and a 0 i . Hence, given a set of alternatives A Q i2N A i and a set of preferences e R i on A i for each agent i 2 N , we can de…ne the associated set of sel…sh preferences R i on A, as the family such that, for all a, a
It is clear that, under sel…sh preferences, indi¤erences among alternatives are mandatory since for all i and any a, a 0 2 A such that a i = a 0 i , any admissible preference R i 2 R i must rank these two alternatives as indi¤erent. For the same reason, the sets R i of admissible preferences must necessarily be di¤erent for di¤erent i's, since the admissible values for each component may be di¤erent, and moreover, their indi¤erence classes for di¤erent agents cannot coincide (not even when all sets A i are equal).
Nevertheless, the following lemma allows us to extend the scope of our results to private good economies, with sel…sh agents.
Lemma 1 If R i is the set of sel…sh preferences for agent i on A Q i2N A i associated to e R i , and e R i is intertwined, then R i is also intertwined.
i 2 e R i the corresponding associate preferences over A i . By intertwined of e R i , there exists e R i such that e R i is a y-transform of e R i and a x-transform of e R 0 i . Let R i 2 R i be the associate preference to e R i over A. Observe that R i is both a y-transform of R i and a x-transform of R 0 i .
Let us now see how Lemma 1 allows us to extend our previous results to other interesting cases. We will consider, in turn, the housing problem, one-to-one matching or the problem of task rationing.
9 In all three cases, A can be represented by an n-tuple of objects.
Housing markets
In the case of housing, each component indicates which house (if any) is assigned to the corresponding tenant. Therefore, all sets A i are the same (they contain the names of all houses and a symbol to denote that no house is received). As for the admissible preferences e R i , it is usually assumed that they are all possible orders on A i . Hence, since e R i is intertwined because it is the set of universal preferences on A i , so, R i is also intertwined. Notice, however, that R i is no longer the universal set of preferences on A. For example, strict preferences are ruled out by sel…shness.
Task rationing
In the case of task rationing, each component indicates what fraction of the task is assigned to each member of the team.
10 Again the possible values of A i are the same for each agent. Preferences e R i on these fractions are assumed to be single-peaked. Hence, since e R i is intertwined, so is R i .
One-to-one matching
In the case of one-to-one matching, each component will indicate what mate is attributed to each participant in the market. Notice that in previous two cases, the same set of objects are possible at each component. This is not the case with two-sided markets, where the A i 's are di¤erent for each agent (as they include all potential mates on the other side of the market, plus herself or himself). In matching (as in housing), the domain e R i is unrestricted and thus intertwined. Again by Lemma 1, R i on A in one-to-one matching is intertwined.
11

Non-intertwined domains
We …nish this section by presenting some examples of preferences violating intertwinedness. We start with the domain of separable preferences.
12 In Example 4 we show this for two candidates, however that argument can be generalized whatever the number of candidates is.
Example 4 (see example in the proof of Proposition 1) Let N = f1; 2; 3g, two candidates a; b can be elected: A = f?;a; b; fa; bgg. The set of individual separable preferences is:
? Observe that R 1 is not (?; a)-intertwined with R 3 , that is, there does not exist a separable preference R i such that R i is both an a-transform of R 1 and a ?-transform of R 3 . For R i to exist, the following should hold: we should be able to go from R 1 to R i by means of a-direct transforms. In particular, R 2 in the chain fR t g, t = 1; :::; k where R 1 = R 1 and R k = R 3 , should be either a reshu-ing of R 1 at a or else a monotonic transformation of R 1 at a. However, neither one nor the other exist.
Although the domain of single-peaked preferences in the problem of the provision of a single public good satis…es intertwinedness, we can easily check that the symmetric singlepeaked domain violates it. Similarly, the domain of single-dipped preferences is not intertwined.
Example 5 Consider only three alternatives ordered as x < y < z, and consider S M the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences on A = fx; y; zg: There are three preferences in S M : R 1 with peak at x, y second and z the worst, R 2 with peak at y where x and z are indi¤erent, and R 3 with peak z, y second and x the worst. Note that R 1 and R 2 are not (y; z)-intertwined. The same argument would allow us to say that a subset R of the strict single-peaked domain such that R = fR 1 ; R 3 ; R 2 g where yP 2 xP 2 z violates intertwinedness.
Example 6 Consider four alternatives ordered as x < y < z < v, and consider D the domain of single-dipped preferences on A = fx; y; z; vg: There are eight preferences in D:
Note that R 1 is not (z; y)-intertwined with R 8 .
Notice also that in the same framework of the provision of a single public good, the domains of single-plateaued, of weakly single-plateaued, and of weakly single-peaked preferences violates intertwinedness ("weakly" denoting that we allow indi¤erence sets outside the top to be two closed intervals, one in each side of the plateau or the peak, respectively). However, each one of these domains of preferences satis…es a weaker domain condition for which our equivalence in Theorem 1 can still be established, with the same proof. Informally, the weaker version would consist in allowing that, in each step of the preferences path, subsequent subsets of the original B y , each one containing y (or B x containing x, respectively) were used to reshu-e or to push them up, instead of having B y …xed (a formal de…nition is available upon request).
We leave to the careful reader to check that other domains of preferences also fail to be intertwined. For example, the preferences used in Cantala (2004) when choosing a level of public good where agents'preferences are single-peaked but having an outside option, or in Miyagawa (2001) , Barberà and Beviá (2002) , and Ehlers (2002b) where the location of two (or more) public facilities is analyzed, are not intertwined domains.
Further properties of social choice functions and their connections
Until now we have explored the connection between strategy-proofness and the two properties of monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance. This is because we …nd both of them very intuitive and because we think that factoring out the di¤erent requirements that can lead to strategyproofness helps our understanding of what is crucial in order to achieve such a desirable property. Notice that rules satisfying monotonicity are abundant, and include the whole family of point voting rules. Hence, our decomposition helps to point at reshu-ing invariance as the main culprit of the di¢ culties in designing strategy-proof rules. At any rate, other authors have displayed alternative conditions which are also tightly connected with the notion of strategy-proofness. In this section, we discuss two of them, both de…ned for strict preferences. One is called strong monotonicity, and was proposed by Moulin (1988) . The other is called strong positive association (see Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) . These are more synthetic properties, that combine in one single condition the type of responses to preference change that we have factored out in our two conditions. Throughout this section, we consider strict preferences to be able to compare our conditions with these two properties used in the literature.
Again, it is clear that strong positive association and strong monotonicity are necessary for strategy-proofness. Moreover, they are also su¢ cient, and thus equivalent to our conditions and to strategy-proofness itself, for functions de…ned on the universal domain. We show that these equivalences break down as we depart form this strong domain requirement and consider rules de…ned on smaller domains. We provide examples and results that clarify the eventual interdependence or independence of these di¤erent conditions. Yet, we also provide a result that re-enforces our previous …ndings about intertwined domains: for functions de…ned on any such domains (of which the universal one is a special case), the conjunction of monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance is equivalent to strong monotonicity and also to strong positive association, with any of them being necessary and su¢ cient for strategy-proofness. This proves that, while di¤erent in a general setting, all of the intuitions expressed through these di¤erent properties are properly captured and become the same when rules are de…ned in intertwined domains, while not necessarily otherwise.
Before de…ning the conditions under discussion, for sake of comparison we write down the monotonicity condition for the case when agents'preferences are strict. De…nition 14 (De…nition 3 for strict preferences) A social choice function f satis…es monotonicity on i2N P i if and only if for any R N 2 i2N P i such that f (R N ) = x, and for any R 0 N 2 i2N P i satisfying the following conditions (i) for any i 2 N , for any y 2 Anfxg; [xP i y ) xP 0 i y] ; and (ii) for any i 2 N , for any y; z 2 Anfxg; [yP i z , yP
De…nition 15 A social choice function f satis…es strong positive association on i2N P i if and only if for any R N ; R 0 N 2 i2N P i such that for any agent i 2 N and any alternative
The di¤erence between monotonicity and strong positive association is that in the latter we require invariance of the rule only for pro…les satisfying part (i) of monotonicity as in De…nition 14.
The other concept is strong monotonicity. 
Strong monotonicity implies our monotonicity condition, however that the converse is false (see Example 8 below).
Our …rst result summarizes the connections between properties in the general case.
Proposition 4 Let f be a social choice social function de…ned on i2N P i . Then, the following statements hold:
(1) If f is strategy-proof then f satis…es strong positive association.
(2) If f satis…es strong positive association then f satis…es reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity.
(3) If f satis…es strong positive association then f satis…es strong monotonicity. (4) If f is strategy-proof then f satis…es reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity.
(5) If f is strategy-proof then f satis…es strong monotonicity.
Next we give four examples to show why some implications do not hold.
Example 7 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; z; tg; and P 1 = P 2 = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g where:
Note that f satis…es strong positive association but f is manipulable (by agent 1 at (R
Example 8 Let N = f1; 2g, A = fx; y; zg; and P 1 = P 2 = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g where:
The proof of Proposition 4 consists, in fact, of the proof of part (3). The reason is that the proof of part (1) was already observed in Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) (when showing the same implication for the unrestricted strict domain, P n ); the statement in part (2) is straightforward by de…nition; and parts (4) and (5) are obtained combining part (1) with (2) and (3), respectively. (3) 
Proof of part
by strong positive association which ends the proof.
Without loss of generality, consider the order of agents 1; 2; :::; n and change one by one individual preferences from R i to R 0 i , starting with agent 1. That is,
Step 1: Repeating the same argument changing the preference of any agent we will obtain that either f (R N ) = f (R 0 N ) or else f (R N ) = x which completes the proof.
In spite of this potential lack of equivalence, the fact is that all conditions become equivalent when applied to social choice functions de…ned in the strict universal domain (see Figure 5 below). The equivalence between each of these conditions and strategy-proofness was indeed the starting point for di¤erent proofs of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite theorem. Rather than an isolated case, this equivalence extends to functions de…ned on any intertwined domain, as expressed in the following result.
Proposition 5 Let f be a social choice function de…ned on an intertwined domain i2N P i . Then, the following statements are equivalent: (i) f satis…es reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity.
(ii) f is strategy-proof. (iii) f satis…es strong positive association.
The proof is a corollary of Theorem 1 and parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 4. We can also obtain the following relationship.
Corollary 1 Let i2N P i be an intertwined domain. Then, any reshu-ing invariant and monotonic rule satis…es also strong monotonicity.
The proof is straightforward by Theorem 1 and part (5) of Proposition 4. The following example shows that the converse of Corollary 1 does not hold.
Example 11 Let N be a …nite set of agents and A = fx; y; v; w; zg be the set of alternatives. The set of admissible preferences is P = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 ; R 4 ; R 5 ; R 6 g where:
We can check that P is an intertwined domain. 13 Let f be such that f (R 1 1 ; R 1 ) = x for any R 1 and f (R l 1 ; R 1 ) = y for l = 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 and for any R 1 . Observe that f satis…es strong monotonicity, thus monotonicity, however f violates reshu-ing invariance (since R 6 is a reshu-ing of R 1 at x; f (R 6 1 ; R 1 ) should coincide with f (R 1 1 ; R 1 ) = x but it is not the case) and of course f is manipulable (agent 1 would manipulate f at (R 13 The proof is case by case and it is available upon request.
In Figure 5 we summarize all the general relationships stated in Proposition 4, the fact that the converse relationships do not hold in general, and also that reshu-ing invariance and monotonicity, jointly, are neither necessary nor su¢ cient for strong monotonicity. Additionally, and for strict intertwined domains (that is, for intertwined domains with only strict preferences), we summarize the relationships stated in Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 and the fact that strong monotonicity does not imply the other properties. 
Intertwinedness and indirect sequential inclusion
In this section and for the case of strict preferences we study the relationship between intertwinedness and another domain condition called indirect sequential inclusion. The latter was shown to be a su¢ cient condition to guarantee the equivalence between strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness (see Barberà, Berga, and Moreno, 2010) . Obviously there are other domain conditions that could be analyzed since they turned out to be crucial to state interesting results in the social choice literature. However, the aim of the paper is not to provide an exhaustive comparison with all domains restrictions that have been proposed in the literature. For the domain we analyze in this section we are able to state additional implications with intertwinedness. We introduce two other domains restrictions in the Appendix that are independent with intertwinedness. 14 Though (indirect) sequential inclusion is also de…ned with indi¤erences, we analyze only the case with strict preferences. To de…ne (indirect) sequential inclusion, let R N 2 i2N R i ; and y; z be a pair of alternatives and denote by S(R N ; y; z) fi 2 N : yP i zg the set of agents who strictly prefer y to z according to their individual preferences in R N .
De…nition 17 Given a preference pro…le R N 2 i2N R i and a pair of alternatives y; z 2 A; we de…ne a binary relation % (R N ; y; z) on S(R N ; y; z) as follows:
Note that the binary relation % must be re ‡exive but not necessarily complete. As usual, we can de…ne the strict and the indi¤erence binary relations associated to %.
De…nition 18 A preference pro…le R N 2 i2N R i satis…es sequential inclusion for y; z 2 A if the binary relation % (R N ; y; z) on S(R N ; y; z) is complete and acyclic. Let us mention that the examples in the following remark could be modi…ed to encompass situations where agents may have di¤erent sets of individual preferences, any …nite set of alternatives, and any number of agents when required.
Remark 1 Consider strict preferences. Intertwined and (indirect) sequential inclusion are independent.
Proof of Remark 1. De…ne a domain R 1 R 2 R 3 , R 1 = fR 1 ; R 2 g, R 2 = fR 3 ; R 4 g, and R 3 = fR 5 ; R 6 g where each R l is de…ned as in the example in the proof of part (3) of Proposition 1. Note that R is intertwined, but it violates sequential inclusion. Let R N = (R 1 ; R 4 ; R 6 ) and (y; z) = (fa; bg; ?). Then, % (R N ; y; z) on S(R N ; y; z) = f2; 3g is not complete (L(R 4 ; ?) * L(R 6 ; fa; bg) and L(R 6 ; ?) * L(R 4 ; fa; bg)). Note also that there is no strict monotonic transformation of R N at z satisfying conditions (1,2,3) in De…nition 22, thus indirect sequential inclusion is violated. Consider now the following subdomain of single-peaked preferences over A = fx; y; zg:
This domain satis…es (indirect) sequential inclusion by Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2010) . However, P is not intertwined since R 3 is not (y; x)-intertwined with R 1 :
As we have just shown, in general, intertwinedness and indirect sequential inclusion are independent. However, in Proposition 6 below we show that any domain satisfying intertwinedness such that all agents have the same set of preferences do also satisfy indirect sequential inclusion. The converse does not hold as we have just shown in Remark 1. Proposition 6 Let i2N P i be an intertwined domain such that P i = P j for any i; j 2 N . Then, i2N P i satis…es indirect sequential inclusion.
Proof. Let R N 2 i2N P i and x; y 2 A. Let S(R N ; x; y) = fi 2 N : xP i yg. Suppose that R N violates sequential inclusion (otherwise, the proof ends). We show that R N satis…es indirect sequential inclusion. Take any order of the agents in S(R N ; x; y), without loss of generality let the order be 1, 2, 3, ..., #S(R N ; x; y) = k. Take agents 1 and 2. By intertwinedness, there exist R 2 that is y-transform of R 2 and also an x-transform of R 1 . Observe that R 2 is such that L(R 2 ; y) L(R 2 ; y) and xP 2 y (that is, R 2 is a strict monotonic transformation of R 2 at y according to De…nition 6 in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno, 2010. Replace R 2 by R 2 in R N . By construction (by transitivity xP 1 y and R 2 is an x-transform of R 1 ), L(R 1 ; y) L(R 2 ; x). Thus, from now on take the new pro…le (R 2 ; R 2 ). Observe that S((R 2 ; R 2 ); x; y) = S(R N ; x; y) and 1 2. Take agents 2 and 3. By intertwinedness applied to R 2 and R 3 ; there exists R 3 that is y-transform of R 3 and also an x-transform of R 2 . Observe again that R 3 is such that L(R 3 ; y) L(R 3 ; y) and xP 3 y (that is, R 3 is a strict monotonic transformation of R 3 at y). Replace R 3 by R 3 in (R 2 ; R 2 ). By construction (by transitivity xP 2 y and R 3 is an x-transform of R 2 ), L(R 2 ; y) L(R 3 ; x), thus 2 3: Note that 1 3 since L(R 1 ; y) L(R 2 ; x) and R 3 is an x-transform of R 2 (i.e. L(R 2 ; x) L(R 3 ; x)) thus L(R 1 ; y) L(R 3 ; x). Repeating the same argument for the remaining agents: 3 and 4, 4 and 5, and so on), we can construct a pro…le R 0 N (R 1 ; R 2 , ..., R n ) that satis…es condition (1), (2), and (3) in part (b) of De…nition 8 of indirect sequential inclusion in the paper Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2010) . Thus, i2N P i satis…es indirect sequential inclusion.
As a corollary of Proposition 6 we obtain that the set of all lexicographically separable preferences violates intertwinedness since as shown in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2010) this domain violates indirect sequential inclusion.
Concluding remarks
We have stressed the fact that the characteristics of the domains for which social choice functions are de…ned are crucial in determining what properties characterize these functions. In particular, we have shown that two very natural properties of social choice functions are equivalent to strategy-proofness for functions de…ned on intertwined domains.
Indeed, the two properties we propose (monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance) are simple and attractive, and it is therefore very natural to ask under what conditions one can understand strategy-proofness as a simple consequence of such elementary requirements.
Although our requirement of intertwined domains is complex, we show it to be satis…ed in several relevant instances, including some leading models for the allocation of public goods and also of private goods. For the environments where it holds, one can strictly identify those functions that satisfy monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance with those that are strategyproof.
We could have slightly altered our de…nition of intertwinedness in order to accommodate some further domains, like those of single-plateaued preferences. We could also have pushed further the implications of intertwined domains regarding the implementability of social choice functions. On that matter, let us just mention some straightforward results about implementation theory when combining our results with others in the literature. For any set of individuals preferences, strict or weak, by part (1) of Lemma 1 above and the revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation due to Gibbard (1973) stating that strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementation, our monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance conditions are also necessary for dominant strategy implementation. More interestingly, when agents'preferences are intertwined and when the social choice function satis…es Saijo, Sjöstrom, and Yamato's (2007) weak non-bossiness, then monotonicity and reshu-ing invariance are also su¢ cient for dominant strategy implementation (straightforward by our Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 in Saijo, Sjöstrom, and Yamato. Note that their weak non-bossiness trivially holds without indi¤erences).
But the main point is made: one should watch for the characteristics of domains. Only if these are rich enough it is possible to extend our intuitions, which are often based on the implicit assumption of universal domain, to other, more restricted contexts. We hope that these methodological points, as well as our examples and detailed results, can be helpful to researchers in the …eld.
Appendix
In this Appendix we show that intertwinedness and two domain conditions that turned out to be crucial to state interesting results in the social choice literature are independent. For lack of space we do not introduce such results and refer the interesting reader to each one of the papers.
Let us mention that all examples in the following remarks could be modi…ed to encompass situations where agents may have di¤erent sets of individual preferences, any …nite set of alternatives, and any number of agents when required.
Intertwined versus connected in Kalai and Muller (1977):
Some needed de…nitions are in order.
De…nition 23 We call a pair of distinct alternatives x and y trivial if there are no R, R 0 2 P i such that xP y and yP 0 x. Thus, the pair (x; y) is trivial if there is always unanimity on it.
De…nition 24 We say that R and R 0 2 P i are connected if there exists a nontrivial pair x; y 2 A such that xP y and xP 0 y, i.e., if they agree on a nontrivial pair.
De…nition 25
We say that R and R 0 2 P i are indirectly connected if they are connected by a …nite chain of connected preferences, i.e. there exist Q 1 , Q 2 ,...,Q n 2 P i such that R = Q 1 , ..., Q n = R 0 and Q i is connected to Q i+1 for i = 1, 2 ,..., n -1.
A domain of preferences P i is indirectly connected if any pair of individual preferences R; R 0 2 P i are indirectly connected.
Remark 2 Intertwined and indirectly connected domains are independent.
Proof of Remark 2. Let the domain i2N P i be such that for any i 2 N , P i = fR 1 ; R 2 g where each R l is de…ned as in the example in the proof of part (3) of Proposition 1. We can check that this domain of preferences is intertwined. Note however that it is not (indirectly) connected since R 1 and R 2 are not connected (the only nontrivial pair is (a; b)). Consider now the following subdomain of single-peaked preferences over A = fx; y; zg: P = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g such that 8.2 Intertwined versus linked in Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003) :
Some previous notation follows: For any R i 2 P i , let r 1 (R i ) and r 2 (R i ) indicate the …rst and the second positioned alternative according to the preference R i , respectively.
De…nition 26 Alternatives a j , a k are connected, say a j a k , if 9R i ; R 0 i 2 P i such that r 1 (R i ) = a j , r 2 (R i ) = a k , r 1 (R 0 i ) = a k , and r 2 (R 0 i ) = a j .
De…nition 27 B $ A and a j = 2 B. a j is linked to B if 9a k ,a r 2 B where a j a k & a j a r :
De…nition 28 P i is linked if 9 : A ! A one to one, such that (i) a (1) a (2) , and (ii) a (j) is linked to {a (1) ; :::; a (j 1) }, j = 3; ::; M:
Remark 3 Intertwined and linked domains are independent.
Proof of Remark 3. The set of all single-peaked preferences S is intertwined (see Proposition 3). Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003) show in their Example 3.4 that the domain S is not linked. On the other hand, Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003) de…ne in their Example 3.1 the following linked domain: "Let B denote an individual set of preferences which has the following property: for all a j ; a k 2 A, there exists R i 2 B such that r 1 (R i ) = a j and r 2 (R i ) = a k .". Let us consider a particular example of B when A = fx; y; z; tg: Observe that R 1 is not (x; z)-intertwined with R 2 . Thus B is linked but it is not intertwined.
